Contemporary Global Food Systems as Contested Space

Published as Chapter 10: Contemporary Global Food Systems as Contested Space: Implications for Special Operations Forces in the Book Strategic latency unleashed: the role of technology in a revisionist global order and the implications for special operations forces (Molly M. Jahn, Aaron M. Kelly, Gregory F. Treverton, Michael S. Gremillion, LTG (Ret.) Edward Cardon, Matthew A. Rose, Megan Konar, Michael J. Puma, David A. Bray, Joseph Byrum, Anthony L. Nguy-Robertson, Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Thomas L. Creely, Seth C. Murray, William L. Oemichen, and Budhikka “Jay” Jayamaha)

“The contingency we have not considered seriously looks strange; what
looks strange is thought improbable; what is improbable need not be
considered seriously.”

—Thomas Schelling, in the forward to Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision [1]

As laid out in both the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy, the global food system is a complex, active area of operations for great-power competition and conflict, influence, and control. The global food system comprises an unconventional, poorly understood risk surface subject to both intentional and unintentional disruptions. Special operations forces (SOF) are regularly called into action where control of provisioning and information about provisioning are linked to power and freedom to operate. The SOF core activities relevant to this chapter include direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and foreign humanitarian assistance. [2]

Military control of supply lines and food distribution to civilian populations has always had tactical, operational, and strategic significance in wartime. The power that resides in the control of “food systems” has been wielded by every human civilization in both peace and wartime. Historical evidence underlines the Roman Republic—the longest-lasting democratic government to date (509–27 BCE)—understood this power explicitly; cura annonae, or “care for the grain supply,” was revered as the goddess Annona. [3] Outbreaks of civil violence as a result of food shortages in Rome are reported to have occurred 19 times, once compelling the emperor to flee for his life and, on another occasion, forcing the return of Caesar from Egypt. [4]

Rome understood military control of shipping lanes was essential for both the application of the domestic rule of law and the Roman ability to mount expeditionary forces. [5] Over the last millennia, when food distribution systems for expeditionary forces or civilians were interrupted or otherwise failed, history-shaping consequences often followed. [6] Domestic food riots generally dismissed in geopolitics may nonetheless have regime-shifting consequences. [7] For example, in 2011, the civil unrest known as the Arab Spring was sparked by rising global commodity prices and local drought, resulting in food riots that led to major shifts of military power in several countries of the Middle East. [8] Spurred by droughts and fires in the Ukrainian breadbasket, Russia exploited the civil instability in the Middle East to establish a renewed sphere of influence in the region with long-term, global geopolitical ramifications for warfare and global terrorism.

The need to control agriculturally productive lands directly or indirectly has determined the boundaries of nearly every nation. Some nations—Argentina, for instance [9] —recognize certain agriculturally significant regions as latent strategic national security assets, restricting ownership to citizens. In contrast, the United States has no policy basis to monitor the ownership of agricultural or food system assets or to systematically monitor essential agricultural goods and services or contingencies relevant to national security.

Agricultural assets include both direct and indirect requirements such as soil and water resources, seed and seed banks, fertilizer, and agricultural implements. In the Embargo Act of 1807, Thomas Jefferson threatened curtailment of US agricultural exports to force Britain and France to change their maritime policies toward the United States. During World War II, the US ability to ramp up agricultural production and support its allies strategically, while also continuing to feed its own population, was critical to victory. [10] After the war, the United States built a global agricultural hegemony that remained stable for decades and reduced US trade deficits and led to enormous economic, political, diplomatic and humanitarian benefits. It also resulted in soft-power influence, with unparalleled agricultural abundance, as seen in the green revolution, fueling steep population increases around the world. The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 authorized the secretary of agriculture to accept up to $700 million in foreign currency for repayment for commodities shipped to friendly nations. [11]

In the 1960s, the John F. Kennedy administration used its Food for Peace program to counter communism in Asia while opening export markets to American farmers. While the idea of food influence has been crucial in building US alliances, especially in Asia and Latin America, the United States does not aggressively protect strategic use of agricultural exports for foreign policy or security agendas today.

Most Americans are unaware that during the past several decades, foreign states or private companies have acquired US agricultural resources and companies. This is occurring as US farmers are in their worst economic position since the early 1980s as a result of sustained low commodity prices, extreme weather, and a prolonged trade war followed by a global pandemic.

Farm exits in some states were at all-time highs in 2019. Financial stress and credit policies are resulting in fewer, further consolidated, and larger operations. In 2019, a polar vortex caused widespread heavy rains, early freezes, delayed harvest, spoiled crops, propane shortages as a result of grain drying, stalled shipping, and full bins. US farmers have suicide rates five times the US average (2017), although statistics are likely skewed to underestimate the actual rates. [12] Some US counties are depleting their aquifers— strategic groundwater reserves—as a result of poor water-management practices and agricultural and trade policies that encourage the export of US fossil water in the form of agricultural commodities. [13]

Moreover, China, Saudi Arabia, and other foreign interests are purchasing US agricultural lands and water rights, often in the absence of legally required notice or complete record keeping, despite the 1978 Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act. In 2017, ChemChina acquired Syngenta—one of the three primary US seed and chemical input suppliers—the largest Chinese acquisition of a US-owned company to that date, while German multinational Bayer purchased Monsanto. Sufficient seed supplies take years of planning, and these genetic resources are unique and invaluable. If, for any reason, these companies either refused or were unable to serve US markets, there would not be enough seed to plant, with no effective recourse or alternative in place.

In short, previous assumptions about the resilience, stability, and productivity of the US food system may not hold, especially under duress, such as biological, artificial intelligence (AI), or other attack. Indirect stressors such as pandemics, market shocks, long-term power-grid failure, or failure of Global Positioning Systems could result in major disruption of the US food system.

Historically, when great powers have mounted an attack, they have anticipated the dynamics of provisioning both their military and civilian populations through either acquired influence (e.g., legal ownership, default technological dominion) or physical control of supply sources and supply lines. For example, in World War II, motivated in part by a vision of agricultural empire, Nazi Germany mounted the blitz through Poland,
Norway, Belgium, Holland, and France and attacked the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa to meet the Axis need for food and resources. [14] As control of energy sources is often a cause of conflict, food as human energy is likewise a necessity of war. [15] For the modern-day United States, fragility in supply chains, masked by peacetime, presents a serious challenge.

Throughout most of human history, widespread precedent exists for the weaponization of food systems against a belligerent or civilian population as a means of control or influence. Article 17 of the 1863 US Lieber Code states: “It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.” [16] Control of food systems has always been key to winning wars. Extraordinary institutional innovations such as the Combined Production and Resource Boards, created by the Allies across national boundaries
during World War II, were fundamental to victory and saved tens of millions of lives. [17] These institutions have been entirely dismantled in the years since, with the last vestiges of control removed by the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act (P.L. 104-127).

Outside US borders, SOF view control of foodstuffs, energy, and other critical provisions as tactical in kinetic war, considered systematically in military planning, but are not generally in a position to think about food resources strategically. The weaponization of food to subjugate or starve civilian populations is prohibited by the Geneva Convention Article 54(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I and Article 14 of the 1977 Additional Protocol II. [18] Unfortunately, this specific prohibition does not clearly limit the weaponization of food or food systems in offensive military contexts, it also does not address gray-zone attacks in the homeland clearly. US actions in this area, therefore, may serve to define and uphold ethical principles of engagement in food systems.

We define “food systems” as the highly complex, complicated, and dynamic critical infrastructures that provide every human being with food every day. [19] SOF must consider unconventional attack surfaces in the homeland, and the potential for both offensive and defensive action in the battlespace defined by contemporary US and global food systems. Attacks on systems, per se, have been used to perpetrate and propagate damage through causal chains of relationship since at least the Gulf War. [20] Recent research has demonstrated the interconnectedness and fragility of the logistical networks supporting US food systems. [21]

The locations of key railway and roadway networks, cargo shipping routes, reservoirs, water-treatment facilities, fertilizer plants, meatpacking/food-processing facilities, seed companies, and ports are public knowledge and, thus, highly vulnerable to targeting by adversaries. US government policy concerning food supply stems largely from the fact that the United States has not experienced warfare in the continental homeland for a century and a half, during which period, the nation has experienced agricultural abundance unparalleled in human history.

Beyond stockpiling Meals, Ready-to-Eat (MREs) for sudden expeditionary requirements—such as attacks or disasters in the homeland— US food-system vulnerabilities have not been a strategic focus of the military since the end of World War II. It was reasonable to assume mid-twentieth-century US and global food systems were extremely stable and could not be easily weaponized. However, this stability is being challenged by the current context.

Since the 1980s, massive shifts in the structure of US food systems have occurred, notably consolidation, duopolization, deregulated algorithmic commodities trading, exponential increases in energy intensity, the advent of embedded “smart” systems and just-in-time delivery. All of these have opened up new attack surfaces in the homeland and ill-understood possibilities for both offense and defense. Recent exercises have focused on cyberattack, military attack, and pandemics, but the implications of these events on national and global food systems have not been explored.

President George W. Bush issued a Department of Homeland Security Presidential Directive to classify the US agricultural system as “critical infrastructure,” followed by revised directives in 2003 and 2013. These policies, in general, have focused narrowly on intentional contamination of the US food system for economic or political terrorism. They fail to address vulnerabilities affected by the trends of consolidation, resource depletion, increases in foreign control, and farm insolvency that have occurred since enactment of these policies. [22]

The SOF’s lenses must be widened to account for unconventional and potentially convergent attack vectors and events. Biological, cyber, and physical threats or mis/disinformation campaigns could be imposed as unconventional attacks, potentially coincident with collateral disruptions to food systems. For example, an unconventional attack launched during the acute global shortage of refrigerated shipping containers, which resulted when the 30,000 units that China ordinarily unloaded per day was abruptly stopped because of the COVID-19 epidemic, could have been especially crippling.

Cyberattacks on the food supply chain could incapacitate machinery and/or computer systems involved with agricultural production, harvest, transport, food manufacturing, inventory control, or market information. Ransomware attacks have increased dramatically in the last few years. The high degree of centralization in the US food systems, coupled with low profit margins and complacency, adds up to potentially consequential interruption from a relatively straightforward act of aggression. Cognitive attacks could result from deepfake proof that food is contaminated. Spoofed or scrambled market or supply information may present particulary difficult challenges because misinformation is formally impossible to disprove. An attack could spur antisocial behavior, such as the 2019 “ice cream licking” incidents or deliberate coughing on produce.

Food systems represent an active area of operations for great-power competition and conflict, which Department of Defense (DOD) or US government policies and military planning do not recognize. Current US military doctrine does not account for food systems in the joint planning process, and arguably hand waves this system as not a military concern (JP 1-0, JP 5-0). [23] A chasm exists between the traditional US concept of “food defense.” Food defense explicitly excludes warfare, but contemporary subkinetic warfare exploits any vulnerable or important attack surface. This gap in US policy opens potential threat space and opportunities for both competitors and enemies to take actions with long-term and immediate impacts. China has clearly understood that control of many types of assets in the global and US food system is critical for its future stability and security. As for other threats, the default approach in the United States since the 1990s has been to “harden,” by stockpiling foodstuffs and raw materials in the event of an attack or emergency.

There is a comforting but false assumption that the commercial sector has unlimited resilience. This view obscures the range of both vulnerabilities and innovative opportunities in the contemporary global and US food systems specifically pertinent to the DOD as both warfighters and peacekeepers. While US defense planners have focused on stockpiles of military foodstuffs (e.g., MRE caches), the US military has not paid enough attention to the complex network structures and properties (e.g., ownership, physical infrastructure, trade policies, institutions, resilience, stability) that govern the US and global food systems. These structures and properties affect US national security and/or define unconventional attack surfaces. [24]

The DOD excels at intelligence, information, and planning. Still, because military planners do not focus on these elements, the defense intelligence enterprise is not tasked with collecting and analyzing relevant information. Protection of US food systems, or aspects of the global food system of particular relevance to US vulnerabilities, may fall to the SOF OCONUS and the National Guard in CONUS. For this chapter, we further parse out this battlespace and discuss potential implications of our current shortfalls in policy and strategy for both SOF and the DOD as a whole.

The evolution of contemporary military food logistics and supply processes has been broadly guided by the post–World War II Hoover Commission, which led to the creation of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). The subsistence directorate of the defense logistics within the DLA oversees the food sourcing for the armed forces. [25] The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia (DSCP) requires each regulated food-chain member to implement a food defense plan in compliance with the DSCP Food Defense Checklist. [26] The Buy American Act and the Berry Amendment require provisions must be purchased from US companies whenever possible, although this requirement was waived for Middle Eastern operations. [27] Perishable items are generally sourced where they are consumed. [28]

Food supply in conflict zones comes from a variety of sources, often only lightly secured (if secured at all). The DLA systems require a high inventory load but may still struggle to fulfill forecasted food requirements. [29] Alternatively, food for forward units is often sourced from DLA-maintained agreements with local and regional networks and acquired ad hoc from local markets. [30] Sourcing may also take advantage of the food systems of the host nation’s military. [31] Official USDA Food Defense suggests hardening food facilities. [32] The Army has a framework, used by the other branches, that requires a food defense assessment team (FDAT) at each service location. [33]

Improvements have focused on increasing the effectiveness of the DLA system of requisitioning food supplies to conflict zones and improving troop nutrition. [34] Various reports analyze the effectiveness of and potential improvements to the military food systems. A 2009 National Defense University report, “Defending the Military Food Supply Acquisition, Preparation, and Protection of Food at US Military Installations,” details food safety and security in DLA processes and military policies. [35]

Consideration of “attack” on the military food system is restricted to material attacks on the food itself by way of contamination, poisoning, or intentional introduction of a food-borne pathogen; threats are classified as biological, chemical, or radioactive. The report concludes it would be “extremely difficult to specifically target food destined for the military this early in the supply chain.”

It is possible, however, that a determined adversary could exploit other types of strikes or vulnerabilities, for instance, interfering with cyber systems and energy supplies, using even disinformation and influence campaigns, and attacking the soft targets on bases where local food service staff come and go daily.

The term “food security” originated at the 1974 World Food Conference, reflecting the prevailing idea that hunger resulted from a physical shortage of foodstuffs. Today, food security is a formal economic statistic derived from nationally reported statistics on agricultural production, exports, and imports and the number of impoverished people, who are subject to political and other contrivances.

The concept has come into wide use since the 1970s. “Food security” or “food insecurity” are most tightly tied to poverty across the development spectrum and, therefore, are not terms that specifically apply to national security or the SOF. An exception is in the extreme case when the US military is summoned for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. In such environments, insurgencies regularly divert and exploit control of foodstuffs and funds from aid efforts. [36]

Increased obesity and diabetes among active-duty military and civilian populations are symptoms of an out-of-whack US food system. An unfit military has come to be a greater threat to US national security than undernutrition. Still, food insecurity experienced by some military families on base has been noted as a specific concern for readiness.

In a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study of the impact of diet-related health on the military, 71 percent of service-eligible young people were deemed unfit to serve, partly because overweight and obesity rose 73 percent between 2011 and 2015 among active-duty personnel; obese active-duty soldiers were 33 percent more likely to experience musculoskeletal injury. The study further noted the DOD spends about $1.5 billion annually on obesity-related healthcare costs. [37]

Despite popular usage, the term food security does not describe a military food system secured to function during the types of large-scale, compound assaults virtually certain to occur in the near future. The term also does not describe a food system upon which a civilian population or the economy depends that is resilient or protected from assault. Shifts in both structure and function of the highly consolidated, highly efficient systems by which food is produced, manufactured, traded, distributed, and consumed have opened potential massive attack surfaces. [38]

Considerable potential exists for malevolent actors to weaponize contemporary “food systems” as an unconventional attack surface, with plausible catastrophic impact. [39] Nodes, or points of control in food systems where direction could be imposed, particularly with reference to ability to or preparedness for war, are not defined. No government, private, or other entity is responsible for identifying, monitoring, or understanding such control points. Current threat taxonomy is incomplete, leading to difficulties in detecting and understanding problems as they emerge. Furthermore, interlinked critical infrastructures in the homeland and globally, upon which the US force depends, are highly vulnerable. Almost every American living room and communication device has opened up a channel through which weaponized mis/disinformation can be delivered. Any aspect of these complex, interlinked networks is vulnerable to cyber or other attacks, whether as an act of aggression in a greatpower kinetic or subkinetic war or an act either to harm US economic, political, civilian systems or to influence warfare. [40]

One example of a nonkinetic act of aggression could be targeting US water security through large-scale saltwater contamination. Ongoing pumping of water into the ground in certain US regions prevents widespread contamination of agricultural soils. Brackish water can result from either disrupting this pumping or increasing the rate of withdrawal, potentially destroying the productivity of that region permanently.

For special operators outside the United States, MREs may be the answer to short-term food supply requirements. But for SOF, it is critical to ensure stable, secure supply lines that recognize the gaps in transfer and the softness of expeditionary bases with regard to food preparation on base. New technologies for “pop up” water, food, and energy sources that can be mainstreamed quickly will improve the stability and security of US forces.

Through its global reach, China is addressing a number of obvious domestic imperatives such as stable long-term food sufficiency, the export of labor and finance, access to critical resources (such as mining), and military and foreign policy objectives. For decades, globalization has driven the development of highly efficient and complex supply networks. The number of companies involved directly with food systems has notably decreased, while their size and relationships in massive conglomerates have increased. [41]

Meanwhile, through acquisitions, direct and proxy purchases, financing arrangements and labor export, Chinese and Russian agricultural capacity is increasing. [42] Recent Chinese acquisitions include Smithfield Foods, the world’s largest pork producer, and Syngenta, mentioned previously, both by state-owned conglomerates. [43] Collateral effects of globalized consolidation and monopolization are increasing global genetic uniformity of crops and livestock and often poorly secured digitized operations. [44]

While China is reportedly outpacing the United States in the development of a number of convergent technologies, (AI, genome editing, biometric fintech, the Internet of Things, chips, qubits, rockets, nuclear reactors, surveillance, mass detention, and fake islands, to name a few) the two superpowers are deeply intertwined and interdependent and share exposure to various existential risks.

In summary, as the United States updates its war plans in light of the NDS—taking into consideration the implications of unconventional, complex threats at scale in any operating environment—SOF must prepare for new offensive and defensive postures in both civilian and military food systems. SOF should consider the control and management of food systems in any preparation for operations and war plans.

In a world where anything can be weaponized almost instantly, including information about an essential commodity in the homeland or abroad, almost anything, including international stature or influence, can be put into play. The perception of agricultural abundance, engineered by President Abraham Lincoln by the suite of visionary legislation he developed during the US Civil War, has lulled US policy into idiosyncratic, narrow channels of concern.

The terms “food defense” or “food security” focus too narrowly on local agricultural production and miss global dynamics that could be leveraged with great impact on or for the DOD. In 2017, DLA organized a summit to create a partnership for all of their supplychain stakeholders.

Shawn Jones summarized what Army Lt. Col. Abel Young, director of DLA Troop Support’s Subsistence supply chain, said during the summit, “the partnership has been effective, but like most complex systems, there is room for improvement. . . . The supply chain is a combination of multiple supply chains with several independent agencies and mutually exclusive contracts which results in ‘a breeding ground for stakeholders with potentially different expectations and objectives.’” He stated a need to better integrate internal and external stakeholders into a streamlined process with a continuous flow of data. [45]

These data could also be purposed for use by AI to build simulation capabilities and identify key control nodes, decision menus, warnings, and threshold protocols, as well as standing capability to screen in real time for essentially any type of threat or its signature. AI-driven representation of food networks will only be as good as the data used to train the capabilities, making it important to deliberate on new data gathering and curation missions.

A DOD-wide standing capability that can identify geospatially events of concern related to global food systems, specifically relevant to DOD’s missions and roles, could usefully reside at the US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and in the Joint Staff. SOF thinking must consider outliers and black swan events in the realm of food-security disruptions to maintain competitive military advantage and possess the moral high ground for national security. It is necessary to strengthen decision-making agility in this fast-paced, disruptive, and complex technological landscape of competing values and political and national security priorities. SOF’s new applied ethics initiative across its operational spectrum will shore up the shortcomings of DOD and US government policies and help mitigate risks. [46]

The SOF should ensure every mission considers both vulnerabilities and potential consequences of shifts in the function of military and civilian food systems in the homeland, in theaters, or on missions as a facet of complex provisioning systems whereby power is created, maintained, and exercised.

[1] Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005).

[2] “Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations,” July 16, 2014.

[3] Rickman, G.E. (1980). “The Grain Trade under the Roman Empire.” Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome. 36: 263.
Downloaded from JSTOR.

[4] NPR, “Roman Banquets, a Calculated Display of Debauchery and Power,” May 20, 2019, https://www.npr.org/sections/
thesalt/2019/05/20/712772285/the-lavish-roman-banquet-a-calculated-display-of-debauchery-and-power.

[5] Geoffrey Rickman, “Plenary Address: Ports, Ships, and Power in the Roman World,” Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome.
Supplementary Volumes 6 (2008): 5–20.

[6] E. M Collingham, The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food, 2013.

[7] Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix, “Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the
Challenges” (World Food Programme, July 2011), https://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf.

[8] Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, “The Food Crises and Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle
East,” ArXiv:1108.2455 [Physics], August 11, 2011, http://arxiv.org/abs/1108.2455; Marco Lagi et al., “The Food Crises: A
Quantitative Model of Food Prices Including Speculators and Ethanol Conversion,” ArXiv:1109.4859

[9] Vinals Blake, Pablo, Sanchez Echague, Ignacio, O’Farrell, Marval, “Agricultural Law in Argentina: Overview,” Thomson Reuters
Practical Law, Agricultural Law in Argentina: Overview, October 1, 2016, https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/4-607-3045.

[10] Collingham, The Taste of War, 2013.

[11] “The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,” Pub. L. No. 480, § 1691 nt, 7 454 (1954).

[12] Todd Fitchette, “Farmer Suicide: The Topic Few Will Discuss,” Farm Progress, June 7, 2018,
https://www.farmprogress.com/outlook/farmer-suicide-topic-few-will-discuss.

[13] Sajani Gumidyala et al., “Groundwater Depletion Embedded in Domestic Transfers and International Exports of the United
States,” Water Resources Research 56, no. 2 (February 2020), https://doi.org/10.1029/2019WR024986.

[14] Collingham, The Taste of War, 2013.

[15] Burton Wright III, “Deep Attack—And I Do Mean Deep,” Army Logistician, no. July-August 2001 (n.d.): 44.

[16] Francis Lieber, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field” (Abraham Lincoln, April 24, 1863),
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule53.

[17] Eric Roll, The Combined Food Board: A Study in Wartime International Planning, Food, Agriculture, and World War II (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1956).

[18] “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 53(1).” (Official Records, June 8, 1977).

[19] Polly J. Ericksen, “Conceptualizing Food Systems for Global Environmental Change Research,” Global Environmental Change 18,
no. 1 (February 2008): 234–45, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2007.09.002.

[20] John Robb, Brave New War: The next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken, N.J.; Chichester: Wiley; John
Wiley [distributor, 2008).

[21] Xiaowen Lin, et al., “Food Flows between Counties in the United States,” Environmental Research Letters 14, no. 8 (July 2019):
084011, https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/ab29ae.

[22] “Homeland Security Presidential Directive / HSPD-9” (Department of Homeland Security, January 30, 2004).

[23] “JP 1-0, JP 5-0,” n.d.

[24] Gwen M. Chodur, et al., “Assessing Food System Vulnerabilities: A Fault Tree Modeling Approach,” BMC Public Health 19, no.
1 (July 3, 2018): N.PAG-N.PAG, https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-018-5563-x\uc0\u8221{} {\i{}BMC Public Health} 19, no. 1
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108 (December 1, 2017): 195–208, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tre.2017.10.015.

[25] Valerie Bailey Grasso, “Department of Defense Food Procurement: Background and Status” (Congressional Research Service,
January 24, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22190.pdf.January 24, 2013

[26] Andrew Mara and Lynn McGrath, “Defending the Military Food Supply Acquisition, Preparation, and Protection of Food at US
Military Installations,” n.d., https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a506611.pdf.

[27] Grasso, “Department of Defense Food Procurement: Background and Status.””plainCitation”:”Grasso, “Department of
Defense Food Procurement: Background and Status.””,”noteIndex”:27},”citationItems”:[{“id”:1626,”uris”:
[“http://zotero.org/groups/2211266/items/XMYI9ZSC”],”uri”:[“http://zotero.org/groups/2211266/items/XMYI9ZSC”],
”itemData”:{“id”:1626,”type”:”report”,”abstract”:”Military food items, also known as subsistence items, are generally
procured under the auspices of the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

[28] Mara and McGrath, “Defending the Military Food Supply Acquisition, Preparation, and Protection of Food at US Military
Installations.”

[29] Mark D. Maj. Pike, “BCT Logistics in Al Anbar Province,” Army Logistician 40, no. 3 (n.d.),
https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/MayJun08/bct_al_anbar.html; James A. Schear, William B. Caldwell, and Frank C.
Digiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security Force,” PRISM 2, no. 2 (March 2011): 135–44.

[30] Charles R. Brig. Gen. Hamilton, “DLA Troop Support Supplies Army Expeditionary Logistics,” Army Sustainment, no. MarchApril 2016 (n.d.): 42–45; Eyal Ziv, “Logistics in Asymmetric Conflicts,” Army Sustainment 44, no. 1 (February 2012),
https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb12/Logistics_Asymmetric.html; Alexander F. Barnes and Sara E. Cothren, “Logistics
Support for Small Unit Operations: The Marine Corps in the Dominican Republic, 1916–1924,” Army Sustainment, no.
November-December 2012 (n.d.): 46–52; Mary K. First Lt. Blanchfield, “Transportation Challenges in Afghanistan,”
Army Logistician 37, no. March-April 2005 (n.d.), https://alu.army.mil/alog/issues/MarApr05/afgan.html.

[31] Ned C. Lt. Col. Holt, “USAREUR Supports Soldiers Through ACSA Orders,” Army Sustainment, no. May-June 2018 (n.d.):
56–59.”container-title”:”Army Sustainment”,”issue”:”May-June 2018”,”page”:”56-59”,”title”:”USAREUR Supports Soldiers
Through ACSA Orders”,”author”:[{“family”:”Lt. Col. Holt”,”given”:”Ned C.”}]}}],”schema”:”
https://github.com/citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}

[32] “Food Defense,” USDA.gov, September 24, 2019, https://www.fda.gov/food/food-defense.

[33] Mara and McGrath, “Defending the Military Food Supply Acquisition, Preparation, and Protection of Food at US Military Installations.”

[34] Ann H. Barrett and Armand V. Cardello, Military Food Engineering and Ration Technology (Lancaster, Pa: DEStech Publ, 2012);
Eric Peltz, “Improving DLA Supply Chain Agility: Lead Times, Order Quantities, and Information Flow,” n.d.; Linda C. Maj. Wade
et al., “Developing Smarter Logistics Support to Remote Areas,” Army Sustainment, no. January-February 2015 (n.d.): 10–17.

[35] “Forward DLA Troop Support Food Defense Checklist,” March 14, 2018, https://www.dla.mil/Portals/104/Documents/
TroopSupport/Subsistence/FoodSafety/FoodQuality/food_defense_check14MAR18.pdf.

[36] Jahn, Molly, et al., “Global Food System Stability and Risk,” Thomson Reuters Special Report (Washington, DC, 2019).

[37] “Unfit to Serve: Obesity Is Impacting National Security” (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, March 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/physicalactivity/downloads/unfit-to-serve.pdf.

[38] “Threats to Precision Agriculture” (Department of Homeland Security, Public-Private Analytic Exchange Program, October 3,
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